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This paper aims to provide a perspective for understanding how actions of agents
in groups are inﬂuenced through interactions with other members of a society. We
acknowledge the rich literature both in game theory, and social networks (participation
games, Networks) that focuses similar topics.
Here we pick a very speciﬁc interaction. We consider situations where one’s decision
to engage in an action, such as a social movement, adapting a fashion or religion,
a production activity, or taking a portfolio decision depends on how people around
one’s social circle behave. Observing people taking similar actions somehow reduces
one’s cost of engaging in the same action. In the context of a production decision,
this reduction in cost may be due to productivity gains as a result of learning a
technique. For an artist, observing works of others should be inspiring, leading higher
chances of better output, (from this perspective it is not surprising that we see artists
generally reside in close neighborhoods where such observations are easier.) In the
context of adapting a fashion, religion participating a social movement, observing
people making similar choices helps you to feel that you are not a complete outlier.
Similarly, for a researcher, subscribing journals to follow works of others is obviously
productivity enhancing and is necessary for creation of original work. We shall refer
this eﬀect as learning (through observing). There is also a vast literature on learning.
([1],[2],[5],[3],[6],[4])
A common and critical property of above examples is that one is free to choose
whom to observe. It is generally the case that observing all members of a society in
not feasible, otherwise prohibitively costly. So one must choose a subset of agents to
observe from overall society. This diﬀerentiates the situations we focus from situations
where you have a ﬁxed neighborhood structure whose overall behavior inﬂuences you
(see, for example [1]). Through this diﬀerentiation we can also provide insights not only
the actions of agents but also about the networks that will form from such observing
behavior of agents in a society. This will allow us to identify inﬂuencing groups of
agents in a society, i.e. hubs.
In this paper we look at the structural properties of societies with above character-
istics. More speciﬁcally following questions are of interest and shall be addressed. (1)
Which conﬁgurations of engagement and communication structures emerge in societies
with agents that are motivated by self interest? (2) How societies that are organized
by self interest compare with the socially eﬃcient conﬁgurations?
Inspired by the situations described, we develop a model to provide formal frame-
work to answer above questions. We consider societies in which members take two
strategic decisions simultaneously; whether to engage in an action or not and the sub-
set of agents they will observe in the society. The cost beneﬁt trade oﬀ of these two
actions are as follows. Engaging in an action provides a ﬁxed beneﬁt to the agent but
is also costly. This cost, which we shall refer as engagement cost, can be reduced if
one is able to observe other agents that are also engaged in the action. That is, the
more people you observe that are also engaged in an action, the more you learn, and is
less costly for you to engage. However, observing others is also costly to the agent. So
although engaging in an action provides beneﬁts, the ﬁnal payoﬀ depends on cost of
engagement and total cost of observing others. It is possible to have situations where
an agent wishes to engage in an action, but cannot, since, in case she does, she will not
be able ﬁnd suﬃcient number of people that she can observe to reduce engagement
cost suﬃciently. But once engagement decision is given agent increases its observation
set as long as the marginal reduction in cost of engagement is higher than the cost of
observing the last included agent.
The observing behavior of agents can be represented with a network where nodes
correspond to agents and an edge from node i to j means, i observes j.S i n c ei’s
observation of j does not imply that j observes i, the network is directed.
In this setting we ﬁrst focus on the stable conﬁgurations of the non-cooperative
simultaneous move normal form game. We provide a complete characterization of stable
network conﬁgurations a society can admit under diﬀerent cost structures. As stability
1notion we employ the Nash equilibrium. So a society is considered stable if for each
agent the proposed strategy is her best response to the state of the rest of the society.
Then we provide a characterization of societies that are eﬃcient, i.e. that maximize
that total payoﬀ. We then compare the two characterizations.
We interprete our formal results as follows. Since our characterizations cover all
possibilities, it follows that there exists a stable state for every society to admit. The
conﬁguration of this state, expectedly, depends on the cost structure.
When cost of engagement is high, there are two possibilities. First, there is no pos-
sibility of engagement since the costs are prohibitively high, and the society naturally
produces nothing. Second, engagement is feasible but inducing an agent to engage in
an action requires high number other engaging agents to be observed. Hence existence
of engaging agents in such societies requires coordination among many agents. Oth-
erwise it is easy for a society to get stuck in a state where no agent acts, unless, for
some reason the collective action is somehow stimulated.
On the other extreme, when the engagement cost is low, learning is very rapid
through observing just a few agents, or cost of observing others is very low, then
every agent engages and observe payoﬀ maximizing number of agents in the society.
As agents are symmetric, number of people each agent observes must be almost the
same. When production cost is low but cost of observing others is high, it is possible
that everybody engages but observe no one.
In the intermediate cases, we observe societies with partial engagement. Yet this
is a very rare case as the setting requires symmetric payoﬀ between both agents that
produce and agents that don’t.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model. We pro-
vide the results on stability in section 3. This is followed by eﬃciency characterization
in section 4. In section 5 we provide an example to illustrate results of the paper.
Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Learning by Observing
We denote by N = {1,...,n} the set of agents in a society. Each agent i ∈ N decides
on two issues: whether to engage in production of non-rival good (yi = 1) or not
(yi = 0) and the set of agents, Si, that she wishes to observe. A strategy of agent i is,
therefore, a pair (Si,y i)w h e r eSi ⊂ N \{i} and yi ∈{ 0,1}.D e ﬁ n eS = {S1,...,S n} as
a network and y = {y1,...,y n} as a production conﬁguration. An n-tuple of strategies
(S,y)={(Si,y i)}i∈N is called a network conﬁguration.
Observing each agent in Si, costs γ>0 for agent i. The beneﬁt of observing other
producers is due to reduction in cost of production. Let β[] be the cost of engaging in
production. If no agent is observed then this cost is at its maximum, ¯ β = β[0] > 0.
With each observed producer, this cost decreases, yet, with a decreasing rate. Hence
we require β￿[] < 0,β￿￿[] > 0. The lower bound of the cost isβ = limx→∞β[x] ≥ 0. The







In what follows we will be focusing on the properties of the pure strategy Nash equi-
librium of the normal form game (N,{Σi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N)w h e r eΣ i is i’s strategy space
Σi = {(Si,y i)|Si ⊂ N \{ i},y i ∈{ 0,1}}.
3 Stable Network Conﬁgurations
Let T be the set of number of agents that are necessary to provide a non-negative
payoﬀ from engaging in production. Formally, T ⊂{ 0,1,...,n− 1} such that ∀i ∈
T,1 − β[i] − γi ≥ 0. We shall refer to T as engagement inducement set. Let t∗ ⊂ T be
the set of number of agents that one needs to observe to maximize her payoﬀ in the
2case that she engages in production, i.e. t∗ = {i ∈ T|∀j ￿= i,β[j]+γj ≥ β[i]+γi}.
Let ˜ t be the set of minimum number of producing agents that is required to induce
an agent to produce. Formally, let i ∈ T be such that ∀j ∈ T \{ i},j>i.T h e nd e ﬁ n e
˜ t = {i,i +1 } if i +1∈ T and 1 − β[i] − γi =1− β[i + 1] − γ(i + 1) otherwise ˜ t = {i}.
The strict concavity of the cost function implies that if 1 − β[i] − γi =1− β[i +
1] − γ(i + 1), we cannot have 1 + β[i + 2] − γ(i + 2) = 1 − β[i + 1] − γ(i + 1), since
β[i] − β[i + 1] >β [i + 1] − β[i + 2]. Therefore the sets ˜ t and t∗ can have at most two
members.1
We start with characterization of societies depending on production conﬁguration.
In societies where no agent engages in production, the unique network structure is
the empty network, since cost beneﬁts cannot be realized (both because agents do not
produce and there are no producing agents to observe). Our ﬁrst result states that
when production inducement set is empty, the unique stable network conﬁguration is
the empty network with no production.
Proposition 1. If T = ∅, then the unique Nash network conﬁguration (S,y) is the
empty network with no production, i.e. ∀i ∈ N,Si = ∅,y i =0 .
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose T = ∅.I f( S,y) is a conﬁguration with no production
then no agent forms any link (as links are costly), so it must an empty network. If
∃i ∈ N with yi = 1, then it must be that 1−β[|Si|]−γ|Si|≥0 contradicting with the
assumption T = ∅.
When production inducement set is non empty, it is always possible to construct
a society in which all agents engage in production. Unlike the case of no production,
production conﬁguration itself, however, does not necessarily imply a unique network
structure. While it is possible to have networks where agents observe each other, i.e.
a complete network, there are also other possibilities. Suppose, for example, T = {0},
in which case, a society where all agents produce but none observe (empty network) is
stable. The following result provides the necessary and suﬃcient condition for existence
of an all producing society.
Proposition 2. There always exists a Nash network conﬁguration where ∀i ∈ N,yi =
1 if and only if T ￿= ∅.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose T ￿= ∅.D e ﬁ n e( S,y) such that ∀i ∈ N,yi =1 ,|Si|∈
t∗. By deﬁnition of t∗, observing |Si| agents maximizes the payoﬀ of typical agent i
while inducing him to produce. As every agent produces, there exists t∗ agent that can
be observed by each agent. Therefore proposed strategy is feasible.
Suppose (S,y) is a Nash network conﬁguration where ∀i ∈ N,yi =1b u tT = ∅.
Then it must be that any i ∈ N,1 − β[|Si|] − γ|Si| < 0 as otherwise it must be that
|Si|∈T. But then, no production and no observation S￿
i = ∅,y￿
i = 0 strictly dominates
(Si,y i) contradicting that (S,y) is Nash.
A non empty production inducement set does not guarantee that agent will always
engage in production. When at least one agent must be observed to induce another
to engage in production or when agents are indiﬀerent between not producing or
producing without observing any other agent it is possible that a society can be stuck
in a stable, typically ineﬃcient, state where no agent produces. This requirement, which
is stated in our next result, simpliﬁes to the condition that the cost of production, with
no agent observed, is at least equal to the beneﬁt from production.
Proposition 3. Suppose T ￿= ∅. Then a Nash network conﬁguration (S,y) with no
production exists if and only if β[0] ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose (S,y) is Nash network conﬁguration satisfying ∀i ∈
N,yi =0b u tβ[0] < 1. Then for i ∈ N the strategy y￿
i =1 ,S￿
i = ∅ provides the payoﬀ
1It is in fact easy to check that if |˜ t| =2d u et os t r i c tc o n v e x i t yo ft h ec o s tf u n c t i o ni tm u s tb e
that t∗ = ˜ t.
31 − β[0] > 0 which is strictly higher than payoﬀ from no production (−|Si|γ ≤ 0)
contradicting with the assumption that (S,y) is a Nash network conﬁguration.
Suppose (S,y) satisﬁes β[0] ≥ 1b u t( S,y)w h e r e∀i ∈ N,yi = 0 is not a Nash
network conﬁguration. Since no one else produces and links are costly, there is no
beneﬁt from observing, so the best response for typical agent i is Si = ∅.I fi produces
its payoﬀ is 1−β[0] < 0 which is strictly less than the payoﬀ of the strategy yi = 0.
We now have a clear idea about the conditions under which we shall expect a society
to engage in production completely or produce nothing at all. What naturally follows is
under what conditions we shall expect societies with partial production, i.e. ∃i,j ∈ N
such that yi =0 ,y j = 1. It turn outs that such situations require both producers
and non producers to have identical payoﬀs. The reasoning behind this observation
is the fact that both non producer and a producer can imitate each other’s strategy,
therefore shall not diﬀerentiate between the two. This in turn implies that producers
gain no strict beneﬁts from production. The condition for existence of such societies
reduces to the condition that there shall be no strict beneﬁts even when there are
enough producers to observe to maximize the payoﬀ. Our next result characterizes
this possibility.
Proposition 4. Suppose T ￿= ∅. Then a Nash network conﬁguration (S,y) with partial
production exists if and only if ∀j ∈ t∗,1 − β[j] − γj =0 .
Proof of Proposition 4. Let (S,y) be a Nash network conﬁguration with partial pro-
duction. Consider agents i and j with yi =1 ,y j = 0. As yj = 0 we can assume that
j/ ∈ Si and Sj = ∅. As both i and j can imitate each other’s strategy, their payoﬀs must
be same, i.e. 1−β[|Si|]−γ(|Si|) = 0. As (yi,S i)i si’s best response with 0 payoﬀ, it must
be that either i. |Si|∈t∗ or ii. the marginal payoﬀ from observing one more agent is still
positive but such an agent does not exist, i.e. #{l ∈ N|yl =1 } = |Si|+1.Case ii. is not
possible since agent j facing one more producer than agent i can set S￿
j = Si∪{i},y￿
i =1
and enjoy a strictly positive payoﬀ. So it must be that |Si|∈t∗,w h i c hy i e l d s˜ t = t∗.
Suppose ∀j ∈ t∗,1−β[j]−γj =0w h i c hi m p l i e s˜ t = t∗. Deﬁne a partial production
network as follows. Let P = {1,...,l+1 } for l ∈ ˜ t.S e t∀i ∈ P,yi =1 ,S i = P \{ i}
and ∀j ∈ N \ P,yj =0 ,S j = ∅. It immediately follows from deﬁnition of set ˜ t that
above strategies for each type of agent is a best response, hence the network is a Nash
conﬁguration.
We shall now focus on the network structures that can emerge from the production
conﬁguration of a society. Our ﬁrst result states that existence of complete network
requires not only that each agent must produce but also that observing all other agents
must be payoﬀ maximizing, that is, (n − 1) ∈ t∗.
Proposition 5. A complete network is Nash if and only if ∀i ∈ N,yi =1and (n−1) ∈
t∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that a complete network is deﬁned as ∀i ∈ N,Si =
N \{ i},s o|Si| = n − 1.
If (S,y) is a Nash complete network, then γ>0 implies that each link must be
with a producer, so ∀i ∈ N,yi = 1 and by deﬁnition of t∗,( n − 1) ∈ t∗.
Similarly, if ∀i ∈ N,yi =1 ,|Si| = n − 1 and (n − 1) ∈ t∗, for each agent i ∈ N,
strategy (Si,y i) is best response by deﬁnition of t∗.
We already noted that while a non producing society must admit an empty network,
it is still possible that a society partially or completely engages in production may
admit an empty network. This requires either that it is optimal for agents not to
observe even in the case of production, which can be due to high observation costs, or
production costs must be prohibitively high to prevent agents from production. The
following result states above observation formally.
Proposition 6. There exists a Nash empty network (S,y) if and only if either 0 ∈ t∗
or β[0] ≥ 1.
4Proof of Proposition 6. Let (S,y) be an empty Nash network but 0 / ∈ t∗ and β[0] < 1.
As β[0] < 1, the strategy for typical agent i, yi =1 ,S i = ∅ strictly dominates no
production, thus ∀i ∈ N,yi = 1. As 0 ∈ T we have t∗ ￿= ∅ and since ∀i ∈ N,yi =1,t h e
strategy yi =1 ,|Si|∈t∗ is a feasible best response strategy which will strictly dominate
yi =1 ,S i = ∅ (since 0 / ∈ t∗ by assumption) contradicting with the assumption that
(S,y) is an empty Nash network.
Suppose 0 ∈ t∗, then for any i ∈ N, yi =1 ,S i = ∅ is a feasible best response, so
the empty network where ∀i ∈ N,yi = 0 is Nash. (Note that if β[0] = 1 empty network
conﬁgurations with partial and no production are also Nash).
Suppose β[0] ≥ 1, then for any i ∈ N, yi =0 ,S i = ∅ is a feasible best response, so
the empty network where ∀i ∈ N,yi = 0 is Nash.
We shall now discuss, informally, when other well known network structures can
emerge in our setting. Existence of links implies that there is complete or partial
production in the society. In case of partial production, which we characterized in
Proposition 4, links must be between producing agents. In the case of complete pro-
duction, which we characterized in Proposition 2, it must be that optimal number of
agents an agent wishes to observe must be between 0 (in which case empty network
forms) and n − 1 (in which case complete network forms).
Consider the wheel network where each agent only observes a single agent forming
a ring. This requires every agent to be producer, weakly beneﬁting from observing a
single agent and no more. This implies necessary condition for existence of a wheel
network is 1 ∈ t∗.2
Consider the star network where (n−1) agents observe a single central agent, and
the central agent observes the (n − 1) other agents. Again this implies a completely
producing society. As every agent produces, any link strategy is feasible. If a single
link and (n − 1) links are chosen best responses it must be that t∗ = {1,n− 1}.T h i s ,
however, due to convexity of the cost function, is only possible if 1 = n−1 or n−1 = 2,
that is, either n = 2 or n = 3.3
We note that none of these structures can be supported as strict Nash network
conﬁgurations.4
4 Eﬃcient Network Conﬁgurations
We are interested in the network conﬁgurations that are eﬃcient. As eﬃciency measure





Our ﬁrst result in this section characterizes the eﬃcient network conﬁgurations. When
production inducement set is empty, a society where no agent produces and no agent
observes others is the unique eﬃcient network conﬁguration.
If there exists a number of producers that will provide strict beneﬁts from pro-
duction, eﬃciency requires all society to produce and each agent to observe optimal
number of agents. When such strict beneﬁts do not exist, but inducement set is not
empty, eﬃcient( societies consists of either (i) with no production, forming an empty
network or (ii) with partial or complete production in which each producer i observes
|Si|∈T = t∗ agents.
Following proposition states this result.
2There are, in fact, three possibilities t∗ = {1},{0,1} or t∗ = {1,2}.I ti sa l s os t r a i g h t f o r w a r dt o
show that this condition is also suﬃcient for existence of wheel networks.
3We can extend our result to other possible variations of a star network. For example if we deﬁne
as t a rn e t w o r ka sas i n g l ea g e n to b s e r v e db ya l lo t h e rm e m b e r so fas o c i e t yo n l y ,t h e no b v i o u s l yt h e
condition will be t∗ = {0,1}.I fw ec o n s i d e rs t a rn e t w o r k sw h e r eas i n g l ea g e n to b s e r v e sa l lo t h e r si n
as o c i e t y ,t h e nt h ec o n d i t i o nw i l lb et∗ = {0,n− 1}.
4As t r i c tN a s he q u i l i b r i u mi saN a s he q u i l i b r i u mw h e r ef o re a c hp l a y e rt h es t r a t e g yi st h eu n i q u e
best response.
5EEE Mention other measures that are possible and why we choose this. EEE
5Proposition 7. (i) If T = ∅, empty network with no production is the unique eﬃcient
network conﬁguration. (ii) If ∃i ∈ T such that 1 − β[i] − iγ > 0, then (S,y) satisfying
∀i ∈ N,yi =1 ,|Si|∈t∗ is the unique eﬃcient network conﬁguration. (iii) If ∀i ∈
T,1 − β[i] − iγ =0 , then, both the empty network with no production , and any
network conﬁguration where each producer connects i ∈ T other producers is eﬃcient.
Proof of Proposition 7 . (i) As T = ∅, the conﬁguration Si = ∅,y i =0i st h eu n i q u e
payoﬀ maximizing strategy for all i ∈ N. Therefore, the payoﬀ of each agent in the
empty network with no production strictly dominates corresponding agent’s payoﬀ in
other conﬁgurations.
(ii) By deﬁnition ∀i ∈ N,yi =1 ,|Si|∈t∗ provides the unique highest payoﬀ
provided that t∗ ￿= ∅ and there are at least |Si| producers other than i. As ∀i ∈ N,yi =1
and T ￿= ∅ both conditions are satisﬁed.
(iii) Let (S,y) be an eﬃcient network. If yi = 1 for some i ∈ N, and there are at
least k ∈ T producers, by deﬁnition linking i with k ∈ T = t∗ other producers maxi-
mizes i’s payoﬀ, setting it πi[S,y] = 0, thus increases total welfare. Otherwise, linking
with k￿ / ∈ T producers, by deﬁnition will provide strictly less payoﬀ, i.e. πi[S,y] < 0,
and the strategy S￿
i = ∅,y￿
i = 0 providing payoﬀ 0 strictly dominates. The result
directly follows from these observations.
Proposition 8. Every eﬃcient network conﬁguration is stable.
Proof. When T = ∅, by Proposition 7 empty network with no production is the unique
eﬃcient network as well as due to Proposition 1 is also stable. When there exist i ∈ T
such that 1 − β[i] − iγ > 0, by Proposition 7 network conﬁguration (S,y)w h e r e
∀i ∈ N,yi =1 ,|Si|∈t∗ is eﬃcient. By Proposition 2 given T ￿= ∅ there exists
a Nash network conﬁguration where ∀i ∈ N,yi = 1. As by deﬁnition linking with
|Si|∈t∗ agents is best response the eﬃcient network (S,y) is also stable. When
∀i ∈ T,1−β[i]−iγ = 0, by Proposition 1 both the empty network with no production,
and any network conﬁguration where each producer connects i ∈ T other producers
is eﬃcient. Note that the condition implies T = ˜ t = t∗. Then by Proposition 4 there
always exists a partial production network where each agent connects i ∈ t∗ = T
agents. Note that the condition ∀i ∈ T,1 − β[i] − iγ =0i m p l i e sβ[0] ≥ 1, which due
to Proposition 6, yields that empty network conﬁguration with no production is also
stable.
But it is clear that not every Nash network is eﬃcient. For this consider the fol-
lowing society.
5 An Example
As an illustrative example we assume a cost function of the form β[x]=¯ βe−αx,w h e r e
α>0w h i c hy i e l d sβ = 0 and β[0] = ¯ β.
Consider the complete network. Proposition 5 states that (n − 1) ∈ t∗ is neces-
sary and suﬃcient condition for existence of complete network. We ﬁrst construct the
condition (n − 1) ∈ T
1 − ¯ βe−(n−1) − γ(n − 1) ≥ 0 ⇒ β ≤
1 − γ(n − 1)
e−α(n−1)
To guarantee that (n−1) also belongs to set t∗, due to the strict convexity of the cost
function, it is suﬃcient to set the parameters so that connecting with (n − 2) agent
provides (weakly) less payoﬀ then connecting (n − 1) agents
1 − ¯ βe−α(n−1) − γ(n − 1) ≥ 1 − ¯ βe−α(n−2) − γ(n − 2)




6Thus, the interval for stable complete network is
1 − γ(n − 1)
e−α(n−1) ≥ ¯ β ≥
γ
e−α(n−2) − e−α(n−1)
which is the triangle indicated with the doted lines in ﬁgure 1.
Now consider the empty network which, due to Proposition 6, requires (i) ¯ β ≥ 1 or
(ii) 0 ∈ t∗. The interval for condition (ii) can calculated by checking ﬁrst that 0 ∈ T
and then 0 ∈ t∗ which show below
1 − ¯ β ≥ 0 ⇒ ¯ β ≤ 1
1 − ¯ β ≥ 1 − ¯ βe−1 − γ ⇒ ¯ β ≤
γ
1 − 1/e
When (i) is satisﬁed with strict inequality, no agent produces unless they observe
some other producer. So stable empty network conﬁgurations cannot involve any pro-
duction. When (ii) is satisﬁed with strict inequalities, then stable empty network con-
ﬁgurations involve full production. Note that both (i) and (ii) can simultaneously be
satisﬁed only when ¯ β = 1 and ¯ β ≤
γ
1−1/e, in which case we can have stable empty
network conﬁgurations than can have partial production.





empty network with no production
empty network with no production
empty network with complete production
complete network
Figure 1: Stable Empty and Complete Networks, n = 10,α=0 .1.
Figure 2 shows the intervals for stable network conﬁgurations according to their
production conﬁgurations. When the production inducement set is empty, the unique
stable network conﬁguration empty network with no production (Proposition 1). When
this set is non empty diﬀerent stable conﬁgurations are possible.
6 Conclusion
We provide characterization of both the production decisions of agents in a society






no production no production
complete production
complete production partial production
Figure 2: Stable Networks, n = 10,α=0 .1.
We illustrate our results with an example. Let us summarize our results by using the
example given in section 5. When initial cost of production is suﬃciently low (¯ β<1)
every agent strictly prefers to produce even without observing others, therefore all
stable conﬁgurations must involve full production. Beneﬁts from observing others will
depend on the link cost γ.W h e nγ is suﬃciently low, every agent observes others,
further reducing their production costs. When γ is high, agents stop observing others,
yet still continue production albeit with higher production cost ¯ β. In the intermediate
cost range for γ, shown as the empty triangle in ﬁgure 1, all agents engage in production
and strictly prefer to observe others, yet observe agents in the range (n − 1) and 0.
In this region network structures other than empty and complete, e.g. wheel network,
are stable with complete production.
When initial cost of production is high (¯ β<1) production requires coordination,
that is, no agent will engage in production unless there exists other producers in the
society. When the observing cost γ is prohibitively high, that is, cost beneﬁts from
observing others cannot justify the cost of observing, no one observes and no one
produces. If costs are suﬃciently low, every body is willing to observe others and
produce, thus forming the complete network conﬁguration.
Note that these are not necessarily the unique network conﬁgurations. Consider the
tip of the triangle indicating the stable interval for the complete network. Why does
the complete network becomes unstable if ¯ β decreases? In this range there are other
stable network conﬁgurations that can coexists with empty network conﬁguration. The
reason that complete network becomes unstable is that the optimal number of agents
to observe decreases, since production cost is already lower, thus agents will prefer to
observe less than (n − 1) agents, but will still produce as long as there are suﬃcient
producers to observe.
The model we provide here forms the basis for a rich set of extensions. One possi-
bility of extension is to consider asymmetries in payoﬀs, due to say cost heterogeneity.
In such a setting we expect agents with cost beneﬁts to have production inducement
sets that to be super set of inducement sets of agents with cost disadvantage.
A shortcoming of our model is that since agents are symmetric, one does not
diﬀerentiate between observing any two agents as long as both engage in production.
8So network structures are not too informative. What naturally follows is introducing
heterogenity to the society.
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